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LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND CONSENTt
LESLIE GREEN*

,The democratic tradition has long maintained that the legitimacy of
political authority depends on the consent of the governed. It is easy to
see why the tradition has not always kept faith with that thesis, however,
for if taken seriously it has radical potential. So consent has been tamed:
first, by inflationary theories which make it almost automatic; and second, by deflationary theories which deny it any important role. Inflation
set in as early as Locke's claim that consent is given "tacitly" by any
peaceful behavior that takes place within the territory of a just government. Kant went even further, maintaining that actual consent is unnecessary so long as it would be rational to consent to the authority in
question. The worst damage, however, was caused by Hume. Both
Locke and Kant knew that consent is not sufficient for legitimacy
because consent does not bind except when it is free and informed and
when it does not exceed the agent's powers to consent. Hume doubted
that anyone actually consents at all, but the truly subversive aspect of his
thought was the deflationary claim that consent is not even necessary.
He held that governments may make law, coercively enforce it, and have
a right to obedience provided only that they are generally beneficial. In
his hands, as in those of the utilitarians, the problem of legitimate
authority dissolved into the question of the good society.
Modern legal philosophy has inherited those traditions of argument.
It is not piety to great books that so implicates political theory in the
theory of law. Rather, here, as at other points,' there is a mutual dependence between the two subjects. Many contemporary theorists are, in
different ways, exploring this relationship; but no one has done more
than Joseph Raz to illuminate its consequences for the legitimacy of law.
In his analytic writings on the nature of authority and in his critical discussions of the obligation to obey, Raz has deepened our understanding
of the problem while defending a distinctive and controversial position.
He denies that everyone has an obligation to obey the law but maintains
@ 1989 Leslie Green. All Rights Reserved.
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law, York University, Toronto.
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that law may be valuable and thus merit our respect. Those who do
respect the law have an obligation to obey even if they do not consent to
be ruled by it. For all its vaunted importance, Raz denies that consent is
central to legitimacy: "[lit can have no more than a marginal ceremonial, as well as an auxiliary and derivative, role. So Hume understood
the matter better than Locke." 2 This Article explores some of these
claims. I shall defend the view that there is no general obligation to obey
but respectfully criticize Raz's argument and offer in its place a modified
version of consent theory.
I.

LAW'S CLAIM

Theories of the nature of law and theories of its moral force are
different, though related, parts of legal philosophy. Contrary to common
supposition, however, there is no positivist or natural law "line" on legitimacy. First, positivists need not hold that there is a general obligation
to obey, for valid law may be so wicked as to merit disobedience, even
counting the risks of disorder. It is true that a complete theory of law
must offer some explanation of its "normativity," some interpretation of
the language of rights and duties used in making and mentioning legal
statements. But there are many possible accounts of that apart from the
thesis that legal obligations are also moral ones.
Second, the most stringent forms of the "social thesis" 3 are perfectly
compatible with the view that there is an obligation to obey. Even if the
existence and content of law can always be determined solely by reference to social facts, there nonetheless may be moral considerations
requiring general obedience to law so defined. Compare the partly analogous case of promises. One might consistently hold that the questions of
whether a promise was made and what it required can be fully answered
by considerations of social fact, while also holding that the values of
autonomy, fairness, or reciprocity mandate that promises be kept. Likewise, thinking that there are morally neutral tests for law does not in the
least commit one to holding that obedience to law is morally neutral.
Hobbes and Bentham, for example, were positivists who advocated very
stringent duties of obedience.
Finally, if natural lawyers are committed only to the thesis that law
necessarily has moral value, then they too can deny any obligation to
obey. There may be necessary connections between law and morality
2. Raz, Government by Consent, in AUTHORITY REVISITED: NoMos XXIX 76, 93 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1987).
3. See J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 37-52 (1979).
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which stop short of imposing such obligations.4 Only on one particularly
crude account does the nature of law settle the problem of legitimacy. If
only those requirements which there is a moral obligation to obey count
as law, then the problem of legitimacy is solved by sheer definition. That
implausible thesis is now rarely defended.
While the nature of law and the problem of legitimagy are thus
partly autonomous, we must remember that they are only partly autonomous, for legitimacy involves the question of whether we should accept
law's claims as valid and it therefore imports some view about what these
claims in fact are. Most abstractly, we could say that law claims authority and that its subjects owe a correlative duty of obedience.' But what
does that amount to? Raz's answer is constrained by his general perspective on the interpretation of legal statements:
To understand legal statements we should interpret them as meant by
those who take them and accept them at face value, those who
acknowledge the law in the way it claims a right to be acknowledged.
The decisive argument concerning the meaning of statements of legal
duties is that the law claims for itself moral force. No system is a
system of law unless it includes a claim of legitimacy, or moral authority. That means that it claims that legal requirements are morally
binding, that is that6 legal obligations are real (moral) obligations arising out of the law.
Here, "legitimate" is used as a full-blooded normative term to be
distinguished both from its purely legalistic use to mean the lawful7 government of some territory and also from its sociological use to mean an
approved or accepted government. Law is legitimate only if it justifiably
claims to impose moral obligations or duties8 on its subjects. An adequate theory of legitimacy must therefore show how law can have this
kind of force. The problem is more complex than is sometimes realized,
4. Id. at 240. Cf. J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 167-68 (1975). Raz writes of
David Lyons that:
"[flie advances, albeit tentatively, the view that the facts which determine the existence

and content of law do not guarantee it any moral value. This, as I said, seems implausible.
What does appear true is that the necessary connection between law and morality which is
likely to be established by arguments of the kind canvassed by the above mentioned
authors [Hart, Fuller, Finnis, Soper, and Lyons] is a weak one. It is insufficient, e.g., to
establish a prima facie obligation to obey the law."
Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295, 323 n.13 (1985) (footnote omitted).
5. For a discussion of the correlativity of obligation and authority, see J. RAz, THE MORALrry OF FREEDOM 23-28 (1986).
6. Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 131 (1984).
7. Cf Raz, On Lawful Governments, 80 ETHICS 296 (1970) ("the lawful government is that
authorized by the positive law of the land").
8. 1 draw no distinction between them.
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for law can guide behavior without obligating at all. Not all reasons for
acting are obligations. Some are purely prudential. Others, though
moral, indicate what is merely desirable or meritorious. Legal requirements purport to do more than this. They tell us not what it would be in
our interest to do, or what it would be nice to do, but what we must do,
what we are bound to do, what we are obligated to do, what others have
a right that we do, and so forth.
The most influential accounts of this stringency have been either
sanction-based or rule-based. Austin and Kelsen, for instance, held that
one has a duty if and only if one may be subject to sanctions for nonperformance. In contrast, H.L.A. Hart maintained that one has a duty if
and only if the behavior in question is required by a social rule which is
enforced by serious pressure to conform, thought important to social life,
and which may conflict with immediate self-interest.9 There are wellknown objections to both theories.'0 Raz attempts to avoid them by basing his account not on the sort of social structures which sustain or
enforce claims of duty, but on the reason-giving character of the claims
themselves. He identifies obligations by a formal and a material feature.
First, they purport to be exclusionary reasons for acting: they defeat
some considerations against acting as one is obligated, not by outweighing them, but by excluding them from consideration altogether. As
applied to obligations imposed by authority, Raz calls this the "pre-emptive" thesis: "[T]he fact that an authority requires performance of an
action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all
other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and
take the place of some of them."" Second, obligations are inherently
goal-independent;they "derive from considerations of values independent
of the person's own goals .... ,, 2
Raz's theory of exclusionary reasons has received critical attention
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 84-85 (1961).
10. For some objections to sanction theories, see id., at 79-88 and Hacker, Sanction Theories of
Duty, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 131-70 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 2d 1973). For some
objections to rule-based theories, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 48-58 (1977) and
N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 55-70 (1981).
11. J. RAZ, supra note 5, at 46 (emphasis omitted). One who takes something as an exclusionary reason does not make obedience conditional on an assessment of the merits of the case, but
rather acts for the reason that it is required. Acceptance of authority is therefore different from mere
compliance with it. One may regularly comply with the law because one judges that what it demands
is, on independent grounds of prudence or morality, for the best. But only those who regard the very
fact that law requires something as a reason for compliance obey it.
12. Raz, Promises and Obligations,in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 224 (P.M.S. Hacker &
J. Raz eds. 1977).
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elsewhere.13 Though it can no doubt be refined, I think that it is broadly
correct, and shall therefore focus only on the material condition. In the
first place, as Raz concedes, voluntary obligations are an exception to it.
The justification for individuals having the power to create, extinguish,
and vary duties is something that can be plausibly explained by reference
to the way having such power serves their goals. This is, however, no
minor exception, for it includes promises, consent, contracts, vows, and
oaths. Whether it is the only exception depends on controversial moral
views. If there are duties owed to oneself, such as a duty to develop one's
talents, then they too are most likely to be explained by reference to the
agent's goals. Or consider the duty not to cause animals unnecessary
harm. Some people do think that the ground of this duty lies in the
interests or rights of animals or in the need not to develop bad habits
which may infect inter-human relations. But others hold that it is wrong
just because it is inhumane, because it corrupts the person who does it.
(Some moralists believe that this also explains certain deontological
restrictions on how we may treat people.) If not corrupting oneself is a
possible goal then these too would be an exception to Raz's analysis.
I wish to express no view on these substantive controversies, but a
general account should not foreclose their outcomes. Even though we
should abandon Hart's practice theory of rules in favor of Raz's idea of
exclusionary reasons, I think we would do well to retain Hart's two
material conditions for obligations: they regulate matters thought important to society and they leave room for backsliding in the sense that they
may conflict with one's immediate self-interest. With respect to the first
point, it is true that some particular obligations are trivial, so obligations
cannot simply be reasons of great weight. However, Hart's claim can
accommodate this. The fact that the obligations to keep a lunch date or
not to walk on a flower bed are trivial does not show that obligations of
promising or property are trivial. Importance applies to general types of
obligations and not necessarily to their particular tokens. The difference
between the second point and Raz's notion of goal-independence is this:
Something can be independent of immediate self-interest though not of
one's own goals because pursuit of such goals may itself require some
restrictions on self-interest. If we say that obligations are grounded in
considerations which do not appeal directly to the agent's immediate selfinterest, then we leave room for the conflict between duty and desire even
13. See Moore, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 827 (1989); Perry, Second OrderReasons, Uncertaintyand
Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 913 (1989). Other valuable discussions include Perry, Judicial
Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 239-43 (1987) and
Gans, Mandatory Rules and Exclusionary Reasons, 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373 (1986).
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in the cases of obligations to oneself and the deontological views
described above while allowing a unified account of voluntary and nonvoluntary obligations.
Accepting with this slight modification Raz's analysis of obligation,
let us turn to the content of the obligation to obey the law. Raz's view
here is a striking one: law does not just claim to obligate, it claims
unlimited power to do so. Legal systems, he argues, are comprehensive,
supreme, and open normative systems. 14 Of these, the first is of special
importance:
We should be careful to see precisely the nature of this feature of comprehensiveness. It does not entail that legal systems have and other
systems do not have authority to regulate every kind of behaviour. All
it says is that legal systems claim such an authority whereas other systems do not claim it. Furthermore, legal systems do not necessarily
regulate all forms of behaviour. All that this test means is that they
claim authority to regulate all forms of behavior, that is, that they
either contain norms which regulate it or norms conferring powers to
enact norms which if enacted would regulate it.15
This is said to be true of all legal systems and not just those, like that of
Britain, which have doctrines of legislative supremacy. Many governments have constitutionally limited legislative powers. But Raz maintains that this fact does not refute his thesis because even such
constitutions may be changed by law, and in any case limited governments claim authority to regulate action even if only by explicitly permitting it. Every legal system by its nature thus claims the right to legislate
on anything whatsoever and to define all possible exceptions to its own
jurisdiction. To put it more bluntly, "[w]hatever activity or pursuit you
may think of, whether or not it is now forbidden by your law, your government claims the right to forbid it. In just about all states there are
legal means to change any law, and to pass any conceivable or inconceivable law." 16
We should scrutinize this account with some care because it foreshadows grave difficulties for some common views about the obligation
to obey the law. Most liberal theorists suppose that a theory of legitimacy need only explain our duty to obey reasonably just governments or
those which do not violate human rights. If Raz is correct, this amounts
to wishful thinking. Because every government demands more, "[a]ny
14.
15.
16.

at 76-77.

J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 116-20; J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 149-54 (1975).
J. RAz, supra note 3, at 117; J. RAz, supra note 14, at 151.
Raz, supra note 2, at 85-86. CompareJ. RAz, supra note 3, at 31 and J. RAz, supra note 5,
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conditional or qualified recognition of legitimacy will deny the law the
authority it claims for itself."17 Such authority seems more likely to
inspire resistance than obedience. We must satisfy ourselves, then, that
the analytic claims are sound and do not repeat Austin's mistake of getting trapped within a tyranny of ill-grounded definitions. As Raz rightly
says, "One can derive a concept from a theory but not the other way

round." 18
Raz claims that the law is more exigent than even the most demanding of our other social institutions. The duties of marriage, for example,
are bounded by both law and convention. Unless we retreat to crude
Austinianism, however, we must admit that this is also true of law. Even
if every government necessarily claims the power to regulate anything
that does not show that every government has such power. Law governs
its own creation, but it can do so by limiting its own authority. (There is
also the somewhat esoteric point that the identity conditions for legal
systems over time limit what a given system can claim: massive changes
in the actual authority of some legal system may amount to changes of a
system.) And custom is equally important. It is often said, particularly
in systems with legislative supremacy, that in political culture lies the
best and, in any case, the only ultimate guarantee of civil liberties. Does
the mere claim to comprehensive authority flatten out such empirical
facts about legal systems so that they become morally irrelevant?
It does not, but other factors magnify its importance. Consider the
weakest claim that a comprehensive authority might make: it may claim
power to regulate some area only by explicit permission. (Raz does not
count implicit permission, i.e., silences in the law, as a mode of regulation.) This is a good deal milder than the assertion that every government claims power to forbid anything. But before we breathe easily
again, it is useful to examine what the actual effects of explicit permission
may be. Once some activity, say freedom of expression, becomes constitutionally guaranteed in this way, it is embodied in certain words or principles rather than in others. A constitution which protects expression
only under the banner of "speech", for example, leaves some other modes
of expression open to restriction. Explicit permission is thus regulation
in the serious, and not just logical, sense.
Next, consider the fact that legal systems of modern states govern
the behavior of large societies. This being so, there is an important asymmetry between citizens and officials. Individual citizens, even in a
17.
18.

J. RAz, supra note 5, at 76.
Id. at 16.
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democracy, are law-takers just as individual consumers in a competitive
market are price-takers. This is not to deny the possibility of genuine
popular control of governments; it is to remind us that such control is
essentially collective in form. To exercise it therefore requires organization and the ability to bear substantial transaction costs. The modem
state is thus quite unlike the family, tribe, neighborhood, or other face-toface communities. The state claims obedience from individuals who can
control the state only in groups. Thus, the notion of self-rule conceals an
important equivocation: the people (jointly) rule the people (severally).
The actual limits on the authority of law therefore reflect the collective
rather than the individual will.
Finally, the actual powers of the most liberal of governments are
both large in absolute terms and larger than those of any other normative
system in their societies. All of them regulate-and not just permissively-personal relationships, property, freedom of action, citizenship,
as well as the process of legislation and the administration of justice.
This applies also to proposals for minimal states. A Nozickian government will protect some kinds of property, prohibit others, enforce certain
agreements, ignore others, define offenses, punish offenders, and so forth.
Even if one favors that regime there is no point in having any illusions
about what it actually does.
Thus, while it is not strictly correct to say that all governments
claim power to forbid anything, it is true that even the weaker forms of
regulation may have profound social consequences and that even limited
governments are institutions claiming vast power. Raz's general view
thus seems well-grounded. Why then have political theorists (anarchists
aside) failed to notice what legitimate political authority involves? In
part, their blindness may be due to a division of labor which has crept
into the subject. Many writers distinguish between the theory of political
obligation which is meant only to apply to reasonably just societies and
the theory of revolution, which specifies conditions under which a change
of the entire system is warranted. Such distinctions may be heuristically
useful. However, they can also conceal the fact that a tyrannical state
and a just one each claims comprehensive authority and does so with a
straight face. Because the problem of legitimacy involves the question of
whether we should concede the state's claims, this familiar distinction
also has its risks.
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II.

HOW AUTHORITY IS JUSTIFIED

Raz advances two claims about how any authority should ideally
operate. The first is a condition of rationality which he calls the "Dependence Thesis": "all authoritative directives should be based on reasons
which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and
are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive."19 That is, law should base its requirements on those things we
should do anyway, such as respect rights, strive for the common good,
promote efficiency, and so forth. But if these are indeed already the right
things to do, then what do we need law for? The answer is that we are
not always able to do them, or to do them well, without authoritative
regulation. That is the basic intuition behind Raz's second claim, the
"Normal Justification Thesis":
[T]he normal way to establish that a person has authority over another
person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying
to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.20
Together, these theses direct us to take authoritative requirements as
exclusionary reasons. If authority is already based on reasons which
apply independently, and if following authority will indeed produce better compliance with those reasons, then we should not take those reasons
into account again upon receiving a directive. The directive itself is
grounded in them and, if followed, will serve them better than would
fresh judgment. In structure, this is like the familiar indirect argument
for following rules. Many common justifications for authority take this
form, but the following are probably the most influential in legal
philosophy.
A.

THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPERTISE

In certain areas, for example in the sciences, some people are more
knowledgeable than others. We often do better to follow their advice in
the relevant matters than we would do either by acting on our own views
or by trying to second-guess and correct their views. It has occasionally
been argued that this also applies to political authority.
19. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
20. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted).
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Scientific judgments are often important to public policy, and there
may be expertise in moral matters as well. Although some actions are
inherently wrong, or mala in se, it does not follow that individuals acting
on their own will always be able to comply with the dictates of morality.
Even if law cannot make things right or wrong, legislators, judges, and
bureaucrats may have a keener insight into morality or into what best
secures compliance with it. If so, we would do better by taking their
directives as binding than we would by following our own lights.
That argument, though capable of greater subtlety and elaboration,
is in all forms an unattractive justification for the authority of law. First,
it is unlikely that the relevant sort of expertise is available in political
affairs. Scientific experts may be authorities on what we should believe
but not on what we should do. There are experts on whales but not on
whether we should save the whales. Second, even if policy-relevant
expertise is available, there is little reason to suppose that officials have
uniquely rich reserves of it. Universities, research organizations, and private individuals often have greater or equal knowledge in certain matters
and thus deserve a hearing as well. However, political authorities do not
just put their voice in, leaving it up to us what weight to give it and
whether to follow it. They purport to settle the question. Finally, and
this is in any case conclusive, there are profound moral objections to a
society run by experts, objections which are rooted in the values of selfgovernment and political equality. In view of this, and because the argument from expertise plays no important part in Raz's theory, I shall say
no more about it.

B.

THE ARGUMENT FROM COOPERATION

In some matters expertise is irrelevant. Consider the traditional
notion of mala prohibita. One must drive on the right side of the road,
and one must pay a certain amount of income tax. In each case, the law
seems not only to identify but also partly to create the correct standards
of behavior. This creative effect is consistent with the dependence thesis
provided that there is reason for everyone to drive on the same side of the
road, and for a certain total amount of income tax to be paid. However,
each of these requirements can be satisfied in many different ways. In
such circumstances the law does not act as an expert-there is nothing
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for it to be an expert on-but instead creates a framework for cooperation where no particular one is independently mandated. It makes concrete and supports desirable ends that might otherwise be frustrated.2 1
The argument from cooperation has a long history, including the
Hobbes's contractarianism and Hume's conventionalism, and it has
recently been revived by a number of legal positivists and natural lawyers. At one point, Raz advanced a very strong version of it claiming
that "[a]ll political authority rests on this foundation (though not only on
it)." 2 2 His most recent view is only a little weaker. He says, "The case
for having any political authority rests to a large extent on its ability to
solve co-ordination problems and extricate the population from Prisoner's Dilemma type situations."2 3
It is uncertain why Raz holds that all or most political authority
depends on the argument from cooperation. It is true that a major justification for having governments at all is to help promote certain forms of
social cooperation (and to prohibit others, such as conspiracies and pricefixing). It is also true that an institution is a government only if it claims
to act with authority. But that does not entail that the reason for governments having authority is in order to promote cooperation, for they may
be able to do that in ways which do not rely on the exercise of authority.
(In Britain, for example, the government is now the second largest purchaser of advertising which it deploys to promote certain behavior and
attitudes.) Raz may be attracted to the above view partly because he sees
law through the lens of the "communication model":24 law guides
human behavior primarily by communicating to its subjects certain standards of appropriate behavior. In order to exercise that technique successfully, law must be able to resolve certain coordination problems
involving, for example, the interpretation of legal statements. Although
this reasoning is sound, it fails to support the argument from cooperation, for these higher order coordination problems are themselves created
by law. Shared interpretations are needed if law is to guide behavior at
all. (Even a coercive threat must be understood if it is to succeed.) The
21. Cf. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAV AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284-89 (1980) (positive law as a
"determination" of natural law); id. at 351-52 (law's function in solving co-ordination problems);
Boardman, Law and Co-ordination,97 ETHICS 546, 552-53 (1987). The most sophisticated account
in the positivist version is Postema, Coordinationand Convention at the Foundationsof Law, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982).
22. J. RAz, supra note 14, 64.
23. J. RAz, supra note 5, at 56.
24. Raz, Dworkin: a New Link in the Chain, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1103 (1986).
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communication model is neutral with respect to the nature and justification of the guidance which law purports to give.
Even if cooperation is not a universal justification for authority, it
may be a possible and important one. This contention is also open to
doubt. I have attempted to refute the argument from cooperation in its
various forms, 5 and I will not elaborate the case here, save for one
polemical point which I relegate to the footnotes.26 The general thrust of
those arguments, however, is as follows: Authoritative directives are not
necessary for cooperation because whenever people have reason to cooperate, other ways of guiding behavior-including exhortation, persuasion
and coercion--can more flexibly achieve their ends without the risks of
generalized authority. Moreover, when directives are issued, their success in promoting cooperation does not depend on them being taken as
authoritative. Rather, success depends on people generally conforming
to what they require but not on conforming as the directives require or
because they require it. Authoritative directives are only sufficient for
securing cooperation in certain rare circumstances: when there is no
temptation to defect from the desirable pattern of behavior and when
there are no competing frameworks for cooperation. (Suppose two people
were directing traffic, one with authority and the other with a gun. Who
would you obey?)
Be that as it may, I think the following is common ground between
Raz and myself, and shows why the cooperation argument does not in
any case warrant taking the law at its word. First, not all legal requirements serve cooperation in any sense, so the argument does not apply to
them. Second, if the existence of a legal system as a whole is taken to be
necessary to securing cooperation, then the argument applies only to
those actions which threaten its existence as a whole, which not all disobedience does. Third, it has never been shown that everyone must accept
25. L. GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 89-157 (1988). See also Green, Law, Coordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1983).
26. As Raz's mention of coordination problems and prisoner's dilemmas suggests, some elementary concepts from the theory of games are useful in presenting and analyzing the argument
from cooperation. However, neither that argument nor its refutation depends on that apparatus.
This seems to have been misunderstood by, for example, Finnis, The Authority ofLaw in the Predicament of ContemporarySocial Theory, I NOTRE DAME J. OF LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 115 (1984),
and also apparently by Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.
LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 139, 152 (1984). Both Raz and Finnis now qualify their use of the term
"coordination problem" with the rider "in the ordinary sense." I am not familiar with this sense.
Perhaps the more general notion of "cooperation" will capture what we all have in mind. The
substantive point for which I contend is that authority is neither a necessary nor generally desirable
way of securing cooperation among people who take account of each other's expectations.
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an obligation to obey the law in order for it to be able to promote cooperation. Finally, even if it were true that only the government can secure
general cooperation, it does not follow that the government can only do
so by issuing authoritative directives. In many cases it should or must
use other techniques.
Whatever the success of the arguments from expertise or cooperation in justifying other forms of practical authority, I conclude that
neither can ground the extensive claims of law, for these justifications
must be context-sensitive in a way that the law is not. Not everyone is
inferior to the officials in wisdom, and not every pressing social problem
is one of cooperation, so there are bound to be people and circumstances
to which the justifications do not apply. It is often said that a policy of
obedience would be better than a policy of deciding each case on its merits. However, those are merely two extreme ideal-typical strategies
which individuals might follow. A policy of general watchfulness would
probably not even be best for criminals and dedicated revolutionaries. In
some matters they would do better simply to obey the law and leave
more free time for deliberation when it really counts. When one begins
to consider the full range of available policies, the arguments quickly
unravel. One might, for instance, adopt the policy of general obedience
when the party for which one voted is in power while judging each case
on the merits when it is not. One might adhere to a policy of obedience
only to governments which act in good faith. Or again, one might divide
laws into core and peripheral concerns and obey only the former while
complying with the latter only when one judges it to be best. The possibilities are endless. How could it be that, among all of them, the policy
of general obedience to law commends itself to everyone? That is the
general reason indirect forms of consequentialism (such as rule-utilitarianism) fail to justify the authority of law. They may show that acting on
some set of rules would always be morally superior to acting on individual judgment, but they cannot plausibly show that acting on the actual
set of legal rules would always be superior. Thus, even when laws are on
the whole good and the government is actiig within its proper bounds,
its claims to authority will be larger than some individuals should grant.
Raz asks, "does following the authority's instructions improve conformity with reason? For every person the question has to be asked
afresh, and for every one it has to be asked in a manner which admits of
various qualifications." 7 This is an important point and goes far to
establishing his thesis that there is no general obligation to obey the law.
27.
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We can, I think, go farther still. On grounds of expertise and cooperation, probably no one has an obligation to obey the law just as it claims to
be obeyed.
III.

THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSENT

Consent theorists, however, hold that some citizens do indeed have
an obligation to obey, namely those who agree to do so. Some consent
theorists also think that all or most citizens have in fact made such an
agreement. Raz, like Hume, denies this. He writes: "Promises and
other voluntary commitments are created by an expressed intention to be
bound. It is clear that the ordinary life of normal citizens includes nothing amounting to a promise or a voluntary undertaking."2 8 I fully agree
that some things often taken to be signs of consent- voting in free elections, inheriting property, not emigrating, etc.-do not, in our societies,
bear such meaning. On the other hand, freely pledging allegiance, taking
oaths of public office, or becoming a naturalized citizen normally do.
The intermediate cases are the most difficult and also the ones on which
political theory casts the least light. Which acts give consent is a matter
which varies among cultures. Political theory can only suggest certain
constraints on interpretation. In any case, the absence of consent need
not trouble a consent theorist. If consent theory correctly states a necessary condition for individuals to owe an obligation to obey the law, and if
they do not consent, then the conclusion is clear enough-they owe no
such obligation. Some, including Hume, regard this as the reductio ad
absurdum of consent theory. This, however, depends on taking universal
political obligation as a basic presumption of any theory of legitimacy. I
have argued against this presumption elsewhere, 9 and Raz's defense of
the flexible justification of authority points in the same direction. Universal obligation is not a pervasive and unshakable feature of moral
thought which must be explained by any competent theory of legitimacy.
It is a controversial political position. Consent theory is not therefore a
failed explanatory hypothesis. It is a critical theory of the conditions
under which we would have such an obligation.
In ordinary speech, "consent" often means little more than approval
or consensus. Raz adopts a stricter definition which is as follows:
Consent is given by any behavior (action or omission) undertaken in
the belief that
1. it will change the normative situation of another;
28.
29.
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2. it will do so because it is undertaken with such a belief;
30
3. it will be understood by its observers to be of this character.
The first criterion refers to things like altering fights, duties, powers
or liabilities, the second to the reflexive role of belief, while the third
makes consent a public act. Only the second needs further comment
here. Consider the following example. If Ann gratuitously punches Bob
in the nose, she changes their normative situation by creating a duty to
compensate Bob and correlatively by giving him a right to compensation.
But even if she believes that as she swings, it will still not be a consensual
obligation because the fact that she believes it is not part of the justification for holding her to be under the duty. The duty is binding because
she is at fault in harming him. A consensual act, in contrast, creates
duties because it is done with the belief that it will do so.3 1
Promissory obligations fall under this conception of consent as a
special case. Unlike consent in general, promises are always intended to
undertake obligations and confer rights. In contrast, "acts undertaken
for another purpose and not in order to consent can constitute consent if
undertaken in the belief that they will confer a right or impose a duty and
if the fact that they are undertaken with such a belief is the reason for
them having this result." 32
Raz exemplifies the principle by suggesting that those who enter a
park and are given notice that in doing so they must abide by the posted
rules thereby consent to the authority of those rules. One does not enter
the park in order to get obligations, but entering the park creates them
and makes one liable to the authority of others because it is undertaken
with that belief. Of course, in most real cases there may be other beliefindependent grounds for holding the parties to be under the duty in question. A rule prohibiting noise in a park may be justified by the potential
nuisance imposed by noise-makers, irrespective of any beliefs they hold
about the consequences of entering the park. The question therefore
arises why duties should ever be made responsive to individual beliefs.
The answer is simply that, under certain conditions, it is desirable that
agents have the power to control their obligations in this way. These
conditions govern the validity of consent-giving acts. Consent must, for
example, be free and informed; it must also be an agreement which citizens are normatively competent to make. If I promise to obey the law in
30. J. RAz, supra note 5, at 81.
31. Legal relationships such as contracts may create duties of both consensual and nonconsensual sorts. The distinction does not, therefore, coincide with any particular legal institutions.
32. J. RAZ, supra note 5, at 83.
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order to avoid being tortured, then I am plainly not bound by my promise. Holding this way of creating duties to be valid would leave people
prey to all kinds of extortion. But neither can I validly promise to murder someone. Such promises are void ab initio. Locke's famous argument in the Second Treatise exploited this truth to show that we cannot
owe a duty of obedience to an absolute government, since we lack the
power to put our lives in jeopardy. He defended this claim on the
grounds that we are God's property and thus it is for Him alone to
decide when we should die. That step no longer persuades many people,
but the structure of his argument is correct: the validity of consent is
bounded by our normative powers.
Raz approaches this problem by asking when the power to consent
to obey a government would be justifiable. He holds that such consent
must satisfy what I shall call conditions of rationality and autonomy 3 3 :
The Condition of Rationality
Acting on the government's directives will promote one's success in following right reason.
The Condition of Autonomy
The government's directives only regulate matters in which acting on
right reason is more important than deciding for oneself how to act.
I will assume that these are both necessary conditions for the legitimacy of political authority and for the validity of consent to obey it.
Consent to be ruled must therefore be qualified at least to this degree.
Are these conditions also sufficient for legitimacy? Raz suggests:
[C]onsent to be governed can be binding only if limited so as to be
consistent with autonomy. That entails that it must be consistent with
the two conditions of legitimacy. But it seems that the two conditions
are in themselves sufficient both to show that the governments that
meet them are consistent with autonomy and that they are legitimate.
There seems to be nothing that consenting to be governed can do. It
imposes no duty and confers no right except those that exist independently anyway.34
As we shall see, Raz refutes the hypothesis that consent is idle by establishing a minor role for it. Despite the somewhat tentative tone, however, he says no more about the hypothesis then that the two conditions
are sufficient for legitimacy. Do they in fact show that a citizen subject
to a government which fully meets them has a duty to obey it? Consider
33. Raz, supra note 2, at 89. The first condition is just the Normal Justification Thesis as
applied to governments. I do not follow Raz in calling these conditions of "legitimacy" because I
argue below that they are not sufficient for it.
34. Id. at 89-90.
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an analogy. Suppose Carol is an excellent investment counselor and that
conformity to her advice is certain to be optimal. Suppose further that
there is no intrinsic value in David managing his own financial affairs.
Does that show that Carol has legitimate authority to act for David? No;
although it does show if she were given such authority she would be
justified in having it, and it also shows that David would be justified in
giving it to her. Why should we think that a government is in a different
position? It is true that the second condition insures that accepting its
authority does not compromise autonomy, but the same applies to
David-if he grants Carol authority to handle his portfolio then his
autonomy is still secure. However, his autonomy is not secure if Carol
unilaterally takes charge of his affairs and then administers them in a
way that assures both rationality and autonomy. The fact that there is
no intrinsic value in managing one's finances does not show that there is
no intrinsic value in deciding whether to do so. For one thing, one may
have a choice between different potential authorities. Similarly, it seems
correct to say that a government satisfying the two conditions deserves
authority but not that it already has it. There may be other actual and
possible regimes which equally deserve one's allegiance, or one may
decide that in spite of the merits of all of them one would still prefer to
retain one's moral independence.
One might, perhaps, object that for any political authority to serve
reason it must also be effective, that is, able to secure a substantial degree
of compliance.3 5 A legal system cannot satisfy the first condition unless
it can generally coordinate behavior, so every legal system which satisfies
the two conditions therefore not only deserves authority but has it. This
invokes the argument from cooperation which I rejected above. Moreover, if efficacy is necessary for legitimacy, that establishes only that a
legal system which deserves authority also deserves to be efficacious. It
would be excessively conservative to maintain that our choice among
authorities must be drawn from the set of those which are already in
power (normally a set of one). All that is warranted is the weaker conclusion that a potential authority must be such that it is feasible for it to
become efficacious, given our present circumstances.
Suppose now that someone does consent to the authority of a legal
system which fully meets the above conditions. In what way does this
change things? It clearly does not make it a better legal system any more
than David's grant of authority to Carol made her a better counselor.
Any improvement would not be a direct consequence of consent, though
35.
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it could be a by-product of the level of information and critical awareness
needed if consent is to bind citizens. The difference it purports to make is
a normative one, but it actually makes that difference only if consent is
valid.
Consent may sometimes be validated by instrumental considerations, for instance, when it serves to protect the consenter (as in consent
to surgery) or to reinforce independent duties (as in promising to tell the
truth). In view of the demanding character of the law's authority and the
need for flexibility, however, consent to obey it can only be justified by
such considerations in the case of some people. But, as Raz says, consent
has a noninstrumental function as well: it may express or create intrinsically valuable relationships. Consent to be married, for example, is not
merely a device for protecting people against below optimal allocations of
partners or reminding them of their preexisting moral duties. It is a constitutive feature of the relationship itself. Raz concedes that consent to
obey the law may also have expressive value but even then only when it is
limited by the two conditions. Those who consent to the rule of the Chilean or South African governments perform an action which is morally
inert. Thus, the most consent can contribute, Raz says, is the minor and
marginal role of closing the gap when the two conditions are nearly but
not quite fulfilled and of reinforcing and expressing one's commitment to
a system which already satisfies them. Consent is valuable only as the
exception rather than the rule. It is useful for officials and the like to
declare publicly their duties but unnecessary and uncommon in the lives
of most citizens. They may be bound to a legitimate government just in
consequence of its value and of their having a certain attitude towards it,
even if they do not express that attitude through consent-giving acts. I
have rejected the claim that the two conditions are sufficient for legitimacy, but it remains to be seen whether non-consensual attitudes can
have the same legitimating function as consent.
IV. THE IDENTIFICATION THESIS
What would we think of people who say that they are obligated to
obey the law "because they are citizens of the state or members of the
society, because the government is their government or the law their
law"? 3 6 We might well be inclined to suppose that they must have no
coherent view about legitimacy at all. To hold that one must obey the
law because it is one's law sounds more like evasion than explanation.
Raz's most interesting thesis is that this reaction might be wrong. He
36. Id. at 97.
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says that although there is no general obligation to obey, one is entitled
to respect the law in such a way that a personal obligation to obey flows
from the very fact that one respects it. This is surprising because it seems
more natural to hold that one is entitled to respect law only if there is an
obligation to obey it. Let me offer an analogy. The old "expressive"
theory of punishment said that we are justified in punishing criminals not
as retribution or deterrence, but just because that is an appropriate
expression of social indignation at crime. That argument is unsound
because it fails to show why we are entitled to feel such indignation or
why punishment is an appropriate expression of it. The normal justifications for punishment warrant indignation only as the upshot of a theory
of criminal justice. They establish that one is entitled to feel indignant at
those who deserve to be punished. Thus, the expressive element has no
independent force. What preserves Raz's claim from the same objection?
He says, "if the attitude of respect is itself the source of the legitimacy of
the authority then it is a self-referential attitude. It respects the authority
because it is legitimate, and it is legitimate because it is respected." 37 The
way out of this hall of mirrors is marked by three attitudes, which Raz
calls "respect" for law, "identification" with the community, and "trust"
in government. These terms arise in slightly different contexts in his
writings, and the relationships among them are not fully explained. The
following, however, seems consistent with most of what he does say.
Identification with one's community, provided that it is reasonably
just, is of intrinsic value as "an attitude of belonging and of sharing in its
collective life" which may be more or less intense but which necessarily
"excludes indifference to the group as well as alienation from it."3 8 It is
good (though not obligatory) to have such an attitude, and it is also good
to express it because that affirms and strengthens the attitude itself.39
When the legal system is an aspect of the community's life, one way of
expressing that identification is by behaving as one who trusts the law,
that is, by acknowledging its moral authority and the correlative obligation to obey it. One who trusts the law exhibits a necessary condition of
respect for the law; one recognizes that there are moral reasons for obeying it.' Thus, the duty of obedience is partly constitutive of practical
37. Id. at 99.
38. Id. at 91.
39. Raz, supra note 2, at 92.
40. J. RAz, supra note 3, at 261, 253.
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respect, an attitude which it is good to have as an expression of identification with the community. There are other ways of expressing one's identification, but at least in our societies, this is one conventional and
important way of doing so.4
Notice that the thesis bristles with qualifications which include or
entail all of the following:
1. Law may not be an aspect of the community. This is true to some
extent in all societies. While law supports some customary practices, it
diverges from or attempts to replace others. The gap between law and
custom is greatest in times of rapid social change and in those countries
in which the legal system is a foreign imposition. Moreover, this divergence is not always a bad thing. Customary norms may be inefficient or
unjust or in other ways undesirable.
2. A community may be worthy of respect while its legal system may
not, and vice versa. This follows from the previous point. The law may
be the worst aspect of some society-its conservative, conflictual, alienated, litigious side. More rarely, it may be more progressive, just, or
integrated than social outlook in general. Typically it will be better in
some respects and worse in others.
3. It is permissible not to respect or identify with a community or legal
system even when that community or system is worthy of respect.
Respect for law is thus like friendship inasmuch as it is valuable, but
never obligatory, to have any friends or to be friends with any particular
person.
4. Expressions of identification are valuable only to the extent that they
reflect, support, and foster identification. Some attitudes are harmed by
their public expression. Whether loyalty to governments is nurtured by
being expressed partly depends on how others understand and react to it
and its value partly depends on whether it has undesirable side effects,
such as promoting xenophobia and the like.
5. Whether obedience to law is in fact an expression of respect is a matter of social convention. A community may deserve respect, its law may
reflect its collective views, its legal system may deserve respect, and yet
obedience to law may not be recognized in that community as an appropriate expression of commitment to the community.
Taking all of these qualifications into account, we are left with what
I shall call the identification thesis:
If one respects a legal system, and if that legal system is worthy of
respect, and if it is worthy of respect as an aspect of a community
41.
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which is itself worthy of respect, then one has an obligation to obey it
because one respects it, provided that this is conventionally recognized
as an appropriate and desirable expression of identification with the
community.
In order for this thesis to help establish legitimacy there must be
both a certain connection between communal relationships and their formal expression in law as well as a practical or normative component to
the attitude of respect. Let us take these in turn. "Respect for law" is
not respect for the law qua law; it is respect for law qua aspect of the
community or, to put it another way, respect for law to the extent that it
is an aspect of the community. The identification thesis is thus only
meant to apply to non-alienated communities whose legal systems are a
faithful expression of what Raz calls "social conventions and outlook."
Note, however, that it is not sufficient for the legal system to be mostly in
step with society, for the identification thesis is offered as an account of
why some people rightly think they are bound by all their laws, provided
they meet the conditions of rationality and autonomy. A patchwork of
concordance and divergence from social outlook would not warrant this,
for even in a reasonably just state law does not claim to bind only to the
extent that it is an aspect of the community.
Let us now turn to the normative character of respect for law. It
may, as Raz says, be possible to respect a legal system only in the cognitive sense of admiring it without thereby feeling bound to it at all. (This
is a common attitude to take towards attractive foreign legal systems.)
And respect may comprise practical attitudes amounting to something
less than recognition of law's binding force. More problematic, however,
is the relationship between obligation and identification. Raz first
introduces the identification thesis in an analogy with friendship, which
is also a complex cluster of cognitive and practical attitudes. There, he
confronts the possible objection that while friendship implicates a whole
gamut of human relations, respect for law seems much narrower; it is
"first and foremost a recognition of a reason to obey the law. Therefore
while it is possible to conceive of certain actions as appropriate to express
the friendship (i.e., the other aspects of the relationship) there is nothing
which obedience for law can express." 4 2 He replies that practical respect
is not really an independent attitude but "one aspect of a complex attitude and style of life, relating not only to the law but to the community
whose law it is." 4 3 This seems to interpret the objector as holding that
42.
43.
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respect for law is narrow because one's attitude to law can express nothing further. That is clearly wrong. The objection may be refined, however. It may mean instead that respect for law is narrow because the
normative attitudes comprising it, principally the obligation to obey and
support the law, are themselves narrow ones. The obligations of friendship-loyalty, reciprocity, caring, etc.-have a content and character
which makes them appropriate expressions of friendly relations. It is, I
think, significant that we do not think of obedience as expressive of
friendship. Respect for law, however, is identified by a duty of obedience. Is that an appropriate expression of the underlying communal relations of belonging and identification?
On this point, compare Raz's account with the more familiar argument that one must obey the state as an expression of one's gratitude for
all that it makes possible. Raz of course denies that it is obligatory to
express identification through obedience, or even at all. In this respect
the arguments are not analogous. But there is also a point of similarity:
both arguments assume that obedience is an appropriate expression of
another, non-obediential, social relation. Why is an obligation of obedience ever an appropriate expression of gratitude? Can we answer: "It is
just a matter of social convention that gratitude may be expressed in this
way"? We normally take evaluative attitudes towards these conventions,
however, and interpret "appropriate" to mean a "desirable" or "fitting"
expression and not just a "usual" one. What Locke says in the Second
Treatise about the biblical injunction to honor one's parents is suggestive
here:
A Man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise Man;
defence to his Child or Friend; relief and support to the Distressed;
and gratitude to a Benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he
can do, cannot sufficiently pay it: But all these give no Authority, no
right to any one of making Laws over him from whom they are
owing."
Locke thus distinguishes obligations imposed by the legal system from
the other kinds of duties we typically owe. Social relationships may
bring very stringent obligations without amounting to an obligation to
obey their commands. According to Locke, the latter must be grounded
in either necessity or consent. Below the age of reason children need to
obey their parents; after that they are only bound by and to the extent of
44.
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their own agreement." His point cannot be that all the enumerated obligations are less demanding than the obligation of obedience. Indeed,
Locke supposes that they are not. But they are all appropriate to the
relationships in question. One thanks a benefactor, respects the wise,
defends a friend. One does not obey them as part of the relationship. For
Locke, obedience is out of place in all these contexts whereas it would be
fitting in the relationship of Creator and created or of parent and child.
However, this is because there are other, primary, grounds sufficient to
validate authority in these contexts. Until we find independent sufficient
conditions for legal authority, the fittingness of obedience as an expression of the communal relationships of membership, solidarity, identification, and so forth is liable to similar doubts.
Before leaving the identification thesis, we should notice one last,
mainly polemical, point. The alleged marginality of consent is due to
two things. First, consent is said to be a rare event in the lives of ordinary citizens. Second, it only binds where the two necessary conditions
for legitimacy are already met or at least nearly so. This seems to give
the identification thesis a certain rhetorical edge since, unlike the oddity
of consent, it is advertised as capturing a more normal social relationship. But that is illusory. Because all real communities are to some
degree alienated from their legal systems, identification of the sort Raz
discusses is an equally, if not more, rare and marginal occurrence. And
the necessary conditions for legitimacy continue to play their role. One
who trusts the law believes there is reason to do as it requires, but the law
must deserve that trust. Above, I argued that the conditions of rationality and autonomy, though necessary, are not sufficient for legitimacy.
They are, however, sufficient for the government to be trustworthy.
Whereas one who consents to the rule of a trustworthy government is
bound by that consent, one who respects a trustworthy government is
bound by that respect only if the law is also an expression of social convention and outlook. Certain qualities of the government are necessary
to validate consent-based obligations, but these same qualities of government as well as other qualities of the society are necessary to validate
respect-based obligations. Since it is therefore more difficult to validate
45. Cf. J.J. Rousseau:
The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of the family; yet children
remain tied to their father by nature only so long as they need him for their preservation.
As soon as this need ends, the natural bond is dissolved. Once the children are freed from
the obedience they owe their father, and the father is freed from his responsibilities towards
them, both parties equally regain their independence. If they continue to remain united, it
is no longer nature, but their own choice, which unites them; and the family as such is kept

in being only by agreement.
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 50 (M. Cranston trans. 1968).
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respect-based obligations, it is hard to see why they should be thought
central to legitimacy while consent is relegated to the ceremonial world
of national anthems, barristers' wigs, and royal families.
V. CONSENT AND THE ROLE OF CITIZENSHIP
The defense of any complex philosophical position, such as consent
theory, consists partly in making it plausible and partly in detaching it
from the implausible claims with which it has become associated. Consent theory emerged with doctrines of limited government, moral individualism, and political instrumentalism. In extreme versions, it
celebrated the notion of the atomic will as the source of all values and
duties. That picture of political life is a profoundly misleading one.
Thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Marx, Burke, Durkheim, and T.H. Green
were all agreed in rejecting it, and Raz is right to join their numbers. But
it is possible to deny that political life is a mere tool or that all values are
purely individualistic and still maintain that it is only by agreement that
good laws become authoritative ones. Any adequate version of consent
theory must be, in a sense, social. My aim is not, therefore, to defend
Locke against Hume. Indeed, on one crucial point, both of them are
wrong about legitimacy. They are political instrumentalists who regard
legal and political institutions as means to essentially private ends-for
Locke, the protection of property and for Hume, the promotion of our
mutual interests. Fortunately, consent theory has more potential than
that.
Many special obligations are attached to social roles, and the obligation to obey may be among them. Parents have a duty to care for their
children, doctors to respect the confidentiality of their patients, judges to
decide impartially, and so forth. Here, I use the term "role" in the sociological sense to mean a fairly stable cluster of deontic expectations which
receive social recognition, roughly what the English moralist F.H. Bradley meant by his more stuffy talk of "stations" and their attached duties.
Not all sets of duties cohere into roles. Those who negligently injure
others owe them duties of reparation, but there is no social role of
"tortfeasor." Which do cohere varies among cultures. Within each culture, however, the relation between a role and its duties is a constitutive
one. It is a matter of fact that we have undertakers and they have certain
duties; but it is a matter of logic that an undertaker has got to do what an
undertaker has got to do.
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Role-duties thus have a relative objectivity, by which I mean, not
that they are self-justifying or uncontroversial, but that they are recognized as being partly beyond the control of their subjects. Roles are
social and not individual creations. One can choose not to be an undertaker, but one cannot choose to be an undertaker with no duty to be
decorous. Not all roles impose valid duties, however. The traditional
gender roles in our societies are among those which do not. When are
they valid? Here, we need a two-part explanation. First, one needs to
justify the clustering of duties into a role at all. Why not instead have
complete flexibility in these matters and insist that people construct their
own roles as they go and according to their circumstances? Radical individualists would no doubt favor this as giving fullest expression to the
sovereignty of will. They might of course concede some minor instrumental benefits to having standard patterns of social interaction, and
they might permit roles as default options. However, they would see
ideal human relations as polymorphous and contractual. Against such a
view, considerations like those which Raz elaborates with great power in
his discussion of the social nature of value4 6 seem to me persuasive.
Common roles may be valued because they are common and embody
social relations which are valuable for their own sake. Beginning with
the ancient world, part of the value of citizenship was recognized to lie in
its character as a shared status purporting to transcend other divisions
among people. The individualist ideal of a multiplicity of different social
contracts does not adequately capture this. Nonetheless, to defend common social roles does not show why they bind their incumbents.
Thus we come to the second problem. Why should socially constituted roles create valid duties? There is no single answer here but rather
a variety of different considerations. Some roles-duties bind nonvoluntarily, most plausibly when others are nonvoluntarily dependent4 7 on
their performance (such as infants on their parents) or when the duties
benefit others but are modest in their demands (for example, the duty of
teachers to be punctual). This supposes, of course, that there are valid
obligations which we never agreed to bear. Could a radical consent theorist deny even this? The difficulty with this view is that we need some
explanation as to why agreements bind, and that explanation cannot
itself appeal to an agreement. One can be as hard-nosed as one pleases
about obligation, resisting any commitments to which one has not specifically agreed, until one reaches the obligation to keep agreements. Here,
46.
47.
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one will need to appeal to reasons of a different sort which, on their own,
will typically justify some nonvoluntary obligations as well. That, in
essence, is how Hume tries to subvert consent theory in his essay, Of the
OriginalContract.4" He says, "The obligation to allegiance being of like
force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by
resolving the one into the other. The general interests or necessities of
society are sufficient to establish both."4 9 Hume's argument fails because
his view of what these general interests amount to is incompatible with
the kind of categorical force that voluntary obligations are normally felt
to have. But that need not be argued here. Consider, however, the general argument given above. Does it establish that citizenship binds
nonvoluntarily? I think not. Other citizens are not nonvoluntarily
dependent on our accepting the state's claim to authority. At most, they
are dependent on our complying with the law in those cases when it
would harm them not to do so. Nor can it be said that what citizenship
requires of us is only modest. As we have seen, every modem state
makes extensive claims to our allegiance. The social role of citizenship is
not, then, liable to the same justifications as the familiar sorts of
nonvoluntary roles.
Roles can, however, also come to bind with our consent, even when
that consent stops short of creating the roles themselves. It may seem
paradoxical that consent could stop just here, but in fact this is just a
generalization of the point made earlier about promises. Promising creates valid obligations because it is desirable for people to have the power
to do so; but it is not desirable for people to be able to determine whether
or not the promising principle applies to themselves. The obligation to
keep voluntary obligations is, therefore, not a voluntary obligation. Similarly, it is desirable that people have the power to choose for themselves
which social roles will structure their lives, but it is not always desirable
that the existence and content of roles should depend entirely on choice.
The validation of consent to role-duties thus proceeds in the same way as
the validation of consent in general and is subject to the same limitations.
However, consent to role-duties proceeds via the assumption of a role
known to bring obligations with it.
Out of an abundance of caution, I emphasize that this is not meant
to establish that everyone has consented or should consent to the role of
citizenship. Nor does it show that every modem society has such a role.
48. D.

HUME, Of the Original Contract,

Miller ed. 1985).
49. Id. at 481.

in ESSAYS:

MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY

(E.F.

1989]

LEGITIMACY AND CONSENT

I believe that many of them do and recognize it as differing from the role
of a tourist or even a resident, occupants of which the law also claims to
bind. This however, is a matter which cannot be established abstractly
and in advance. The claim is a narrower one: we can reject moral individualism at the structural level by conceding the inherent value of
shared roles yet without marginalizing consent. This proposal can only
succeed if it makes sense to think of people consenting to roles. In some
cases it plainly does. For example, judges and doctors take oaths which
bind them to do what their stations require. However, parents and
undertakers do not. In discussing the relational obligations inherent in
friendship, Raz makes some observations which seem to suggest that
social roles and the like cannot sensibly be seen as the objects of consent.
Raz maintains that, unlike consensual obligations, relational obligations
have the following features:
1. They cannot be created or terminated by a "single act" but only
through "the normal habit-forming processes of education and
habituation";" °
2. They are partly constitutive of the social relation in which they occur
and are not formed by the act of assuming such a relation;5"
3. They are "by-products" of the relationship rather than its "point or
52
purpose";
4. They are not fully voluntary;
at best they are "semi-voluntary
5' ' 3
submission[s].
performative
These observations are suggestive and might easily be applied to social
roles. They do not, however, distinguish all consensual obligations from
relational ones. Only the final point does that, and, when correctly
understood, it casts doubt on the validity of nonconsensual obligations to
obey the law.
Raz's first point combines two different ideas: there is the contrast
between a single act and a process, and the contrast between deliberation
and habit. Is a consent theorist committed to holding that consensual
obligations are always assumed by one single act? This may ultimately
depend on one's view about the individuation of actions: what, after all,
is a single act? At the very least, the necessity of including omissions
among ways of giving consent complicates matters. At what moment
does an omission take place? How many omissions were there? These
50. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 257; Raz, supra note 2, at 93. But cf.J. RAZ, supra note 5, at 94
("it would be wrong to regard consent as a one-off act of identification").
51. J. RAz, supra note 3, at 257.
52. Id. at 257-58.
53. J. RAz, supra note 5,.at 98.
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questions are pointless. Moreover, can a process not be a consensual one,
emerging through stages of agreement? The contrast between habitual
and deliberative processes is thus the salient one. We shall return to it
below.
The second point, contrasting constitutive and assumed obligations,
also cuts across the distinction between relations and consent. The traditional marriage vows are consensually assumed by the parties, but at the
same time they partly constitute the marriage. Moreover, they are internally related to a whole web of other valuable human relations. There
are, indeed, other ways of getting many of the obligations in question, but
there are no other ways of getting married. Consent may occasionally be
justified by the very fact that it has such a constitutive role.
The third point draws too much power from the highly instrumental
flavor of the term "by-product." Raz writes, "People may create a
friendship in order to have someone to care for, but not, normally, in
order to have an obligation to care for someone." 54 That is true. However, those who consent to being searched before boarding a plane do not
normally do so in order to give someone else a right to search them but in
order to board the plane. Even in the special case of promising, where
the assumption of an obligation is an essential aspect of the transaction, it
is ill-described as being its purpose. The purpose of promising to meet a
friend for lunch is normally to meet a friend for lunch, not to have an
obligation to keep a promise. Relational and consensual obligations do
not, therefore, necessarily differ in their ends, as the third point seems to
suggest, but only in their means. A promise essentially invokes a certain
means in order to achieve purposes which may be identical with those of
nonvoluntary obligations. There is to be sure, a somewhat weaker connection between ends and means. Some normative relationships are
poorly served by being created through agreements. There is, for example, something nightmarish in imagining social life being taken over by
extensive use of explicit contracts. However, this is not because it signals
the abandonment of a particular set of aims but because other side effects
of formally regulated relationships can undermine some of the aims we
seek to achieve.
Raz's final point is, I think, the nub of the matter and accounts for
what is plausible in the others. Relational obligations are not fully voluntary. By this Raz means that while one is free to assume or terminate
54.

J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 258.
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them, one normally does so without believing that one's acts attract obligations. Consent, in contrast, always incorporates as a reflexive but nonredundant element the fact that certain actions are believed to bring
about certain duties because they are done in that belief. One cannot
consent by accident. But one's awareness of the normative consequences
of one's actions may be more or less complete, so voluntariness is a matter of degree.5 5 In purely relational contexts, that awareness is either
wholly lacking or is redundant in justifying the obligations in question.
This is why we naturally describe the emergence of such relations in
terms of habituation rather than choice and why the theory of socialization offers a plausible explanation of how such relations take hold.
When we thus distinguish the fact that consent depends on such
awareness from the mistaken claim that it must be given by a single act
whose purpose is to assume obligations and whose connection to social
roles is purely instrumental, consent begins to look more attractive. The
theory which emerges, however, differs significantly from many of the
classical versions. Its centerpiece is not the social contract but rather the
notion of people assuming roles in awareness of the duties that they
bring. It is true that this will rarely be a single act of commitment. The
choice sometimes cannot be made as a whole; opportunities for commitment often present themselves only one by one as the role gradually
emerges. Consider becoming a lawyer. Some stages on the way involve
direct choices-applying to law school, writing the bar examinations,
taking an oath. Others are simply omissions, such as bypassing other
opportunities. No doubt other aspects, such as adopting distinctive
modes of dress and speech are matters of socialization. In such a case,
occupying the role involves a whole cluster of commitments and choices
such that it makes no sense to ask which was the commitment or the
moment at which one became a lawyer. Nonetheless, it makes perfectly
good sense to say of one person that he or she chose to become a lawyer
and of another that he or she blundered or grew into it. A choice-laden
process can be consensual provided only that it meets the usual conditions for consent. Perhaps it is too crude to put socialization all on the
side of habit and choice all on the side of deliberation. Socialization may
include rational awareness of its consequences, and choice often takes
place within a framework of options and preferences which are not themselves the subject of deliberation. However, the general contrast remains
sound. Note also that the above remarks do not establish that lawyers
are bound by their roles only if they choose to become lawyers. On the
55. See Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 916, 929 (1982).
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contrary, their case fits easily within the usual justifications for
nonvoluntary duties. The claim was merely that roles commonly
thought of as emerging through processes can also be the results of
consent.
The social role of citizenship can be acquired in various ways ranging from habituation to conscious choice. Role-bound consent restricts
its validity to those cases falling well towards the deliberate end of the
spectrum. For many people their feelings of loyalty to the law are results
of convention, custom, inculcation, or habit. Raz holds that "where the
attitude they give rise to morally valuable it is so even if it is not acquired
as a product of deliberate choice." 56 But to show that it is valuable does
not show that it is obligation-imposing, as our discussion of the identification thesis revealed. Moreover, where the stakes are so very high there
is a connection between the presence of deliberation and the likelihood
that the attitude will in fact track right reason. The willing acceptance of
the role of citizen thus remains central to transforming a valuable legal
system into a legitimate one. Nonetheless, as Raz shows, on any account
its legitimacy must be qualified and on no account will it conform to the
classical doctrine of political obligation.
Did Hume, after all, understand legitimacy better than Locke? I
doubt it. Locke knew that consent had its limits, and he knew that it had
to be validated. It is true that he did not do much to explain why consent
binds, and he was almost certainly wrong about which actions, even in
his society, were signs of consent. Here, Hume's skepticism is welldeserved. But Hume's own account was deeply flawed. And, interestingly enough, even he could not resist the pull of the democratic tradition. In revising his famous essay he felt compelled to add the following
remark: "My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people
from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is
surely the best and most sacred of any.""7 Hume never saw that his own
theory could offer no account of why this should be so. Yet the truth is
not far to seek. Our attitudes to law, like our feelings of identification
with our own communities, are encrusted with habit and custom. In this
area, good habits are fostered by the high degree of awareness that deliberation requires. By limiting the individual's obligation to obey to those
circumstances in which the role of citizenship is willingly assumed, consent ensures that obligations track right reason. By acknowledging the
value of social roles, it avoids extreme individualism. The normal
56.
57.

Raz, supra note 2, at 93.
D. HUME, supra note 48, at 474 (emphasis added).
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processes of socialization may provide an explanation of common feelings of loyalty, but they do not justify them, at least not when they have
as their object the authority of law.

